

The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

The war [of 1812] has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessened.

Albert Gallatin, '1816

Prologue: The western war hawks in Congress, bitter about maritime grievances against Britain and the British-backed Indian raids on the frontier, engineered a declaration of war on Britain in 1812. But the pro-British Federalists of New England vehemently opposed "Mr. Madison's War" as a scheme of the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans to ruin them economically and politically. With the nation thus dangerously divided, the war went badly for the Americans, and ended with the Treaty of Ghent (1814), which essentially restored the status quo. Yet partly as a result of Andrew Jackson's stirring victory over the British at the Battle of New Orleans, an outburst of nationalism followed the otherwise frustrating War of 1812. As time went on, the chief setback to nationalism was the ominous sectional quarrel over slavery in Missouri. The volatile issue of slavery was eventually contained for a period of years by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, but it smoldered on until it finally exploded in the Civil War in 1861. In foreign affairs, meanwhile, nationalism manifested itself in the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which warned the European powers to keep their hands off the two American continents.

A. The Cauldron of War

I. Tecumseh Challenges William Henry Harrison (1810)

The American frontiersmen blamed the British for egging the Native Americans on to attack them, but actually American greed was goad enough. William Henry Harrison,

¹C. M. Depew, ed., *The Library of Oratory* (New York: The Globe Publishing Company, 1902), vol. 4, pp. 363–364.

the aggressive governor of Indiana Territory, had negotiated a series of land-grabbing agreements with the Indians, culminating in the Treaty of Fort Wayne (1809). Two Indian tribes, ignoring the rights of all others, sold 3 million acres of their ancestral lands for a pittance. The gifted Shawnee chief Tecumseh, together with his visionary brother the Prophet, was then organizing the Indians against white encroachments. Absent when the Treaty of Fort Wayne was negotiated, Tecumseh journeyed angrily to Vincennes (Indiana), where, in a stormy scene, he confronted Governor Harrison and threatened to resist white occupancy of the ceded lands. How valid was his main grievance?

I would not then come to Governor Harrison to ask him to tear the treaty and to obliterate the landmark. But I would say to him: Sir, you have liberty to return to your own country.

The Being within, communing with past ages, tells me that . . . until lately there was no white man on this continent; that it then all belonged to red men, children of the same parents, placed on it by the Great Spirit that made them, to keep it, to traverse it, to enjoy its productions, and to fill it with the same race—once a happy race, since made miserable by the white people, who are never contented, but always encroaching. The way—and the only way—to check and to stop this evil is for all the red men to unite in claiming a common equal right in the land, as it was at first, and should be yet. For it never was divided, but belongs to all for the use of each. That no part has a right to sell, even to each other, much less to strangers; those who want all, and will not do with less.

The white people have no right to take the land from the Indians, because they had it first. It is theirs. They may sell, but all must join. Any sale not made by all is not valid. The late sale is bad. It was made by a part only. Part do not know how to sell. It requires all to make a bargain for all. All red men have equal rights to the unoccupied land. The right of occupancy is as good in one place as in another. There cannot be two occupations in the same place. The first excludes all others. It is not so in hunting or traveling; for there the same ground will serve many, as they may follow each other all day. But the camp is stationary, and that is occupancy. It belongs to the first who sits down on his blanket or skins which he has thrown upon the ground; and till he leaves it no other has a right.

2. Representative Felix Grundy Demands War (1811)

Following Tecumseh's speech and the subsequent Indian raids on the frontier, Governor Harrison led an army provocatively toward the headquarters of the Indians. On the night of November 7, 1811, at Tippecanoe near the Wabash River (Indiana), he succeeded in beating back an Indian attack. This hollow but costly victory further inflamed the West, from which came Henry Clay and other leaders of the war hawks to Congress in 1811. Among them was Felix Grundy of Tennessee, three of whose brothers had been killed by the Indians. As the most famous criminal lawyer

²*Annals of Congress*, 12th Congress, 1st Sess., 424–426 (December 9, 1811).

in the Southwest, he had often cheated the gallows by reducing the jury to tears. In this eloquent speech in Congress, which grievances were peculiarly western, and which ones were nationwide? What interest did westerners have in freedom of the seas?

I will now state the reasons which influenced the Committee [on Foreign Affairs] in recommending the [war] measures now before us.

It is not the [Atlantic] carrying trade properly so called about which this nation and Great Britain are at present contending. Were this the only question now under consideration, I should feel great unwillingness (however clear our claim might be) to involve the nation in war for the assertion of a right in the enjoyment of which the community at large are not more deeply concerned.

The true question in controversy is of a very different character; it involves the interest of the whole nation. It is the right of exporting the productions of our own soil and industry to foreign markets. Sir, our vessels are now captured when destined to the ports of France, and condemned by the British Courts of Admiralty, without even the pretext of having on board contraband of war, enemies' property, or having in any other respect violated the laws of nations.

These depredations on our lawful commerce, under whatever ostensible pretense committed, are not to be traced to any maxims or rules of public law, but to the maritime supremacy and pride of the British nation. This hostile and unjust policy of that country towards us is not to be wondered at, when we recollect that the United States are already the second commercial nation in the world. The rapid growth of our commercial importance has not only awakened the jealousy of the commercial interests of Great Britain, but her statesmen, no doubt, anticipate with deep concern the maritime greatness of this republic. . . .

What, Mr. Speaker, are we now called on to decide? It is whether we will resist by force the attempt, made by the [British] government, to subject our maritime rights to the arbitrary and capricious rule of her will. For my part I am not prepared to say that this country shall submit to have her commerce interdicted, or regulated, by any foreign nation. Sir, I prefer war to submission.

Over and above these unjust pretensions of the British government, for many years past they have been in the practice of impressing our seamen from merchant vessels. This unjust and lawless invasion of personal liberty calls loudly for the interposition of this government. To those better acquainted with the facts in relation to it, I leave it to fill up the picture.

My mind is irresistibly drawn to the West. Although others may not strongly feel the bearing which the late transactions in that quarter [Tippecanoe] have on this subject, upon my mind they have great influence. It cannot be believed, by any man who will reflect, that the savage tribes, uninfluenced by other powers, would think of making war on the United States. They understand too well their own weakness and our strength. They have already felt the weight of our arms; they know they hold the very soil on which they live as tenants in sufferance. How, then, sir, are we to account for their late conduct? In one way only: some powerful nation must have intrigued with them, and turned their peaceful dispositions towards us into hostilities. Great Britain alone has intercourse with those Northern tribes. I therefore infer that if British gold has not been employed, their baubles and



trinkets, and the promise of support and a place of refuge, if necessary, have had their effect.

If I am right in this conjecture, war is not to commerce by sea or land. It is already begun; and some of the richest blood of our country has already been shed. . . . The whole Western country is ready to march; they only wait for our permission. And, sir, war once declared, I pledge myself for my people—they will avenge the death of their brethren. . . .

Ask the Northern man, and he will tell you that any state of things is better than the present. Inquire of the Western people why their crops are not equal to what they were in former years; they will answer that industry has no stimulus left, since their surplus products have no markets. . . .

This war, if carried on successfully, will have its advantages. We shall drive the British from our continent. They will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our Indian neighbors and setting on the ruthless savage to tomahawk our women and children. That nation will lose her Canadian trade, and, by having no resting place in this country, her means of annoying us will be diminished.

3. Causes of the War (1812, 1813)

~~The "Second War for American Independence" was prompted by events on the frontier as well as on the high seas. The first print below, entitled A Scene on the Frontiers as Practiced by the Humane British and Their Worthy Allies, may have been inspired by the August 1812 "Massacre of Chicago," in which it was reported that British officers had purchased American scalps from Indians. The second scene, The Tory Editor and His Apes Giving Their Pitiful Advice to the American Sailors, pre-~~

³Library of Congress, #USZ62-5800; Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington.



4. President James Madison's Fateful War Message (1812)

Scholars once believed that Madison—mild-mannered and highly intellectual—was prodded into war by the purposeful war hawks from the West. The truth is that the president, unable to wring concessions from the British, worked hand in glove with the war hawks. In his following War Message, does he seem more concerned with purely western grievances than with national grievances? Which of his numerous charges against England carries the least conviction?

British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it, not in the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal [internal] prerogative over British subjects. British jurisdiction is thus extended to neutral vessels. . . .

⁴J. D. Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (1896), vol. 1, pp. 500–504.

The practice . . . is so far from affecting British subjects alone that, under the pretext of searching for these, thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public law and of their national flag, have been torn from their country and from everything dear to them; have been dragged on board ships of war of a foreign nation and exposed, under the severities of their discipline, to be exiled to the most distant and deadly climes, to risk their lives in the battles of their oppressors, and to be the melancholy instruments of taking away those of their own brethren.

Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain would be so prompt to avenge if committed against herself, the United States have in vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations. And that no proof might be wanting of their conciliatory dispositions, and no pretext left for a continuance of the practice, the British government was formally assured of the readiness of the United States to enter into arrangements such as could not be rejected if the recovery of British subjects were the real and the sole object. The communication passed without effect.

British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our entering and departing commerce. To the most insulting pretensions they have added the most lawless proceedings in our very harbors, and have wantonly spilt American blood within the sanctuary of our territorial jurisdiction. . . .

Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. . . .

Not content with these occasional expedients for laying waste our neutral trade, the Cabinet of Britain resorted at length to the sweeping system of blockages, under the name of Orders in Council, which has been molded and managed as might best suit its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers. . . .

It has become, indeed, sufficiently certain that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation. . . .

In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain toward the United States, our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers—a warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons, without connecting their hostility with that influence, and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that government.

5. Federalist Congressmen Protest (1812)

A group of thirty-four antiwar Federalists, outvoted in the House, prepared the following remonstrance, which was widely circulated. One of its leading authors was the unbridled Josiah Quincy, who, the year before, had declared that if the territory of Louisiana was admitted as a state, the Union was "virtually dissolved," and that like-minded men must "prepare definitely for a separation—amicably, if they can; violently, if they must." The protest of the thirty-four congressmen was in effect a reply to Madison's War Message. After minimizing or partially justifying Britain's provocative maritime practices and Indian policy, the statement continued as follows. How plausibly does it make its points regarding the futility of the war and the folly of becoming a virtual ally of France? To what extent does it describe the war as immoral?

If our ills were of a nature that war would remedy, if war would compensate any of our losses or remove any of our complaints, there might be some alleviation of the suffering in the charm of the prospect. But how will war upon the land protect commerce upon the ocean? What balm has Canada for wounded honor? How are our mariners benefited by a war which exposes those who are free, without promising release to those who are impressed?

But it is said that war is demanded by honor. Is national honor a principle which thirsts after vengeance, and is appeased only by blood? . . . If honor demands a war with England, what opiate lulls that honor to sleep over the wrongs done us by France? On land, robberies, seizures, imprisonments, by French authority; at sea, pillage, sinkings, burnings, under French orders. These are notorious. Are they unfelt because they are French? . . . With full knowledge of the wrongs inflicted by the French, ought the government of this country to aid the French cause by engaging in war against the enemy of France? . . .

It would be some relief to our anxiety if amends were likely to be made for the weakness and wildness of the project by the prudence of the preparation. But in no aspect of this anomalous affair can we trace the great and distinctive properties of wisdom. There is seen a headlong rushing into difficulties, with little calculation about the means, and little concern about the consequences. With a navy comparatively nominal, we are about to enter into the lists against the greatest marine [sea power] on the globe. With a commerce unprotected and spread over every ocean, we propose to make a profit by privateering, and for this endanger the wealth of which we are honest proprietors. An invasion is threatened of the colonies of a power which, without putting a new ship into commission, or taking another soldier into pay, can spread alarm or desolation along the extensive range of our seaboard. . . .

The undersigned cannot refrain from asking, what are the United States to gain by this war? Will the gratification of some privateersmen compensate the nation for that sweep of our legitimate commerce by the extended marine of our enemy which this desperate act invites? Will Canada compensate the Middle states for New York; or the Western states for New Orleans?

Let us not be deceived. A war of invasion may invite a retort of invasion. When

⁵*Annals of Congress*, 12th Congress, 1st Sess., 2219–2221.

we visit the peaceable, and as to us innocent, colonies of Great Britain with the horrors of war, can we be assured that our own coast will not be visited with like horrors? At a crisis of the world such as the present, and under impressions such as these, the undersigned could not consider the war, in which the United States have in secret been precipitated, as necessary, or required by any moral duty, or any political expediency.

6. *The London Times Cries Vengeance (1814)*

Congress had declared war on Britain in the confident expectation that Napoleon would pin down British forces in Europe. After his power crumbled in 1814, three veteran armies of redcoats were readied for invasions of the United States. The powerful London Times, eager for a thrashing of the Yankees, thundered against any reasonable peace terms. Why did this journal believe that the Madison administration was untrustworthy and treacherous? Why was it willing to trust the Federalists?

... Let us direct our attention to the situation of America. By a gradual but entire subversion of the Constitution, the faction who are impregnated with the most deep and rancorous hatred of Britain had possessed themselves of the supreme power in the United States. They abused that sacred trust, to put, as they fondly hoped, the last hand to our ruin.

Let the memorable era of June, 1812, be ever had in remembrance, when these wretches joined with the Corsican tyrant [Napoleon] to overwhelm Russia and Britain at once. Scepticism itself cannot doubt of the infamous pre-concert. Charity, that hopeth all things, and believeth all things, cannot persuade itself that the motive was not most black and malignant.

Let us follow up their attack on Canada, the real object of their hostilities. Let us recall to mind their insidious proclamations to the British subjects to revolt, and their invitation to the Indians to join them. Foiled and defeated in these views, let us not forget that with the most unblushing effrontery they turned round and accused us of inhumanity in accepting the proffered cooperation of the very Indians whom they first courted to their standard. . . .

Is it possible that men who have carried on hostilities with so diabolical a spirit can have relaxed their whole system, and that so suddenly, from any other motive than fear? They are struck to the heart with terror for their impending punishment—and oh! may no false liberality, no mistaken lenity, no weak and cowardly policy interpose to save them from the blow! Strike. Chastise the savages; for such they are, in a much truer sense than the followers of Tecumseh or The Prophet.

Let us not be so foolishly confiding as to trust again to the honour or veracity of the Madisons, the Jeffersons, or any of the tribe, to whom we are well aware that those principles are altogether unknown. A real peace with them is impossible. But, as we predicted of Bonaparte, so, and with much more confidence, do we predict of them—their fall is at hand, if we do but persevere in a vigorous prosecution of hostilities. . . .

⁶*London Times*, May 24, 1814.

With Madison and his perjured set, no treaty can be made; for no oath can bind them. But his political antagonists are men not insensible of the many claims we have on their friendship, not unmindful of the common origin and common principles which they share with us.

7. The London Times Bemoans Peace (1814)

The British had expected to topple the United States by invading northern New York in 1814, but the redcoats were turned back at Plattsburgh by Thomas Macdonough's spectacular victory on Lake Champlain. The hard-pressed Americans, meanwhile, had completely abandoned their demands on impressment and other issues, and gladly accepted the stalemate Treaty of Ghent. The grim reality was that the British had begun the war with over eight hundred ships in their navy, the Americans with sixteen. When the war ended, the British still dominated the seas, whereas the Americans, although they had won a dozen or so single-ship duels, were down to two or three warships. But one would hardly have thought so from the following anguished outburst in the London Times, which irresponsibly urged nonratification of the treaty. Why was this influential journal so unhappy? Did it present a false picture of British operations?

... [The European powers] will reflect that we have attempted to force our principles on America, and have failed. Nay, that we have retired from the combat with the stripes yet bleeding on our backs—with the recent defeats at Plattsburg and on Lake Champlain unavenged. To make peace at such a moment, they will think, betrays a deadness to the feelings of honour, and shows a timidity of disposition, inviting further insult.

... "Two or three of our ships have struck to a force vastly superior!"—No, not two or three, but many on the ocean, and whole squadrons [to Perry and Macdonough] on the Lakes. And their numbers are to be viewed with relation to the comparative magnitude of the two navies. Scarcely is there one American ship of war which has not to boast a victory over the British flag; scarcely one British ship in thirty or forty that has beaten an American.

Our seamen, it is urged, have on all occasions fought bravely. Who denies it? Our complaint is that with the bravest seamen and the most powerful navy in the world, we retire from the contest when the balance of defeat is so heavily against us. Be it accident or be it misconduct, we enquire not now into the cause. The certain, the inevitable consequences are what we look to, and these may be summed up in a few words—the speedy growth of an American navy—and the recurrence of a new and much more formidable American war. . . .

The [American] people—naturally vain, boastful, and insolent—have been filled with an absolute contempt of our maritime power, and a furious eagerness to beat down our maritime pretensions. Those passions, which have been inflamed by success, could only have been cooled by what in vulgar and emphatic language has been termed "a sound flogging." But, unfortunately, our Christian meekness has in-

⁷London Times, December 30, 1814.

duced us rather to kiss the rod than to retaliate its exercise. Such false and feeble humanity is not calculated for the guidance of nations.

War is, indeed, a tremendous engine of justice. But when justice wields the sword, she must be inflexible. Looking neither to the right nor to the left, she must pursue her blow until the evil is clean rooted out. This is not blind rage, or blinder revenge, but it is a discriminating, a calm, and even a tender calculation of consequences. Better is it that we should grapple with the young lion when he is first fleshed with the taste of our flocks than wait until, in the maturity of his strength, he bears away at once both sheep and shepherd.

B. Disloyalty in New England

1. A Boston Paper Obstructs the War (1813)

The antiwar bitterness of the New England Federalists found vigorous voice in Major Benjamin Russell's Columbian Centinel (Boston). The editor, earlier fined twenty shillings for spitting in the face of a journalistic adversary, believed that a French-loving cabal of Virginia planter lordlings had provoked unnecessary hostilities. He charged that this Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican group, headed by President Madison, was determined to ruin the Federalists by destroying their commerce and by carving new states out of Canada—states that would outvote the New England bloc. Considering that the United States had already been at war for six months, was this editorial treasonable? What was the validity of its charges? How far did it go toward secession?

The sentiment is hourly extending, and in these Northern states will soon be universal, that we are in a condition no better in relation to the South than that of a conquered people. We have been compelled, without the least necessity or occasion, to renounce our habits, occupations, means of happiness, and subsistence. We are plunged into a war without a sense of enmity, or a perception of sufficient provocation; and obliged to fight the battles of a cabal which, under the sickening affectation of republican equality, aims at trampling into the dust the weight, influence, and power of commerce and her dependencies.

We, whose soil was the hotbed and whose ships were the nursery of sailors, are insulted with the hypocrisy of a devotedness to sailors' rights, and the arrogance of pretended skill in maritime jurisprudence, by those whose country furnishes no navigation beyond the size of a ferry boat or an Indian canoe. We have no more interest in waging this sort of war, at this period and under these circumstances, at the command of Virginia, than Holland in accelerating her ruin by uniting her destiny to France. . . .

We resemble Holland in another particular. The officer [offices] and power of government are engrossed [monopolized] by executive minions, who are selected

¹*Columbian Centinel* (Boston), January 13, 1813.

on account of their known infidelity to the interest of their fellow citizens, to foment divisions and to deceive and distract the people whom they cannot intimidate. . . .

The consequence of this state of things must then be either that the Southern states must drag the Northern states farther into the war, or we must drag them out of it; or the chain will break. This will be the “imposing attitude” of the next year. We must no longer be deafened by senseless clamors about a separation of the states. It is an event we do not desire, not because we have derived advantages from the compact, but because we cannot foresee or limit the dangers or effects of revolution. But the states are separated in fact, when one section assumes an imposing attitude, and with a high hand perseveres in measures fatal to the interests and repugnant to the opinions of another section, by dint of a geographical majority.

2. The Hartford Convention Fulminates (1814)

As the war dragged on, the British extended their suffocating blockade to the coasts of New England. The New Englanders, forced to resort to costly defensive measures, complained bitterly that their federal tax payments were being used to fight the war elsewhere. Late in 1814, with Massachusetts and Connecticut as ringleaders, twenty-six delegates assembled secretly in a protest convention at Hartford, Connecticut. Although some of the Federalist extremists spoke brazenly of immediate secession, conservatives like the venerable George Cabot sat on the lid, saying, “We are going to keep you young hotheads from getting into mischief.” The final resolutions, less treasonable than commonly supposed, were a manifesto of states’ rights and sectionalism designed to revive New England’s slipping national power, avert Jeffersonian embargoes, and keep new western states from outvoting the charter members. Which of these proposed amendments were most clearly sectional, and which one probably had the best chance of adoption at the time?

Resolved, That the following amendments of the Constitution of the United States be recommended to the states. . . .

First. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons. [Aimed at reducing southern representation based on slaves.]

Second. No new state shall be admitted into the Union by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses.

Third. Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days.

Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof.

²Timothy Dwight, *History of the Hartford Convention* (1833), pp. 377–378.

Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, except such acts of hostility be in defense of the territories of the United States when actually invaded.

Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States. [Aimed at men like Jefferson's Swiss-born secretary of the treasury, Albert Gallatin.]

Seventh. The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time; nor shall the President be elected from the same state two terms in succession. [Prompted by the successive two-term tenures of Jefferson and Madison, both from Virginia.]

Resolved, That if the application of these states to the government of the United States, recommended in a foregoing resolution, should be unsuccessful, and peace should not be concluded, and the defense of these states should be neglected, as it has been since the commencement of the war, it will, in the opinion of this convention, be expedient for the legislatures of the several states to appoint delegates to another convention, to meet at Boston . . . with such powers and instruction as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require.

[The legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut enthusiastically approved the Hartford Resolutions. Three emissaries from Massachusetts departed for Washington with their demands, confidently expecting to hear at any moment of a smashing British victory at New Orleans, the collapse of the peace negotiations at Ghent, and the dissolution of the Union. Instead came news of the smashing British defeat at New Orleans and the signing of the peace treaty at Ghent. The Hartfordites were hooted off the stage of history, amid charges of treason that cling to this day.]

3. John Quincy Adams Reproaches the Hartfordites (1815)

Independent-minded John Quincy Adams, son of the second president and destined to be the sixth president, rose above the sectional prejudices of his native New England. Elected to the Senate by Massachusetts, he reluctantly voted for the Louisiana Purchase appropriation and subsequently supported Jefferson's unpopular embargo as preferable to war. The Federalists of New England now regarded him as a traitor. After serving as one of the five American negotiators of the Treaty of Ghent, he wrote the following spirited attack on the Hartford Convention. What, in his view, was the ultimate aim of the Hartfordites?

The [Hartford] Convention represented the extreme portion of the Federalism of New England—the party spirit of the school of Alexander Hamilton combined with the sectional Yankee spirit. . . .

³Henry Adams, ed., *Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1800–1815* (Boston: 1877), pp. 283–284, 321–322.

This coalition of Hamiltonian Federalism with the Yankee spirit had produced as incongruous and absurd a system of politics as ever was exhibited in the vagaries of the human mind. It was compounded of the following prejudices:—

1. An utter detestation of the French Revolution and of France, and a corresponding excess of attachment to Great Britain, as the only barrier against the universal, dreaded empire of France.
2. A strong aversion to republics and republican government, with a profound impression that our experiment of a confederated republic had failed for want of virtue in the people.
3. A deep jealousy of the Southern and Western states, and a strong disgust at the effect of the slave representation in the Constitution of the United States.
4. A belief that Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison were servilely devoted to France, and under French influence.

Every one of these sentiments weakened the attachments of those who held them to the Union, and consequently their patriotism. . . .

It will be no longer necessary to search for the objects of the Hartford Convention. They are apparent from the whole tenor of their report and resolutions, compared with the journal of their proceedings. They are admitted in the first and last paragraphs of the report, and they were:

To wait for the issue of the negotiation at Ghent.

In the event of the continuance of the war, to take one more chance of getting into their own hands the administration of the general government.

On the failure of that, a secession from the Union and a New England confederacy.

To these ends, and not to the defense of this part of the country against the foreign enemy, all the measures of the Hartford Convention were adapted. . . .

∴ *The Missouri Statehood Controversy*

1. *Representative John Taylor Reviles Slavery (1819)*

The slaveholding territory of Missouri applied to Congress for admission as a state in 1819. Representative James Tallmadge of New York touched off the fireworks when he proposed an amendment to the Missouri statehood bill (a) prohibiting any further introduction of slaves and (b) freeing at age twenty-five all children born to slave parents after the admission of the state. During the ensuing debates, a leading role was played by Representative John W. Taylor, a prominent antislavery leader from New York who was to serve for twenty consecutive years in the House. The South never forgave him, and later engineered his defeat for election as Speaker. In his speech for the Tallmadge amendment, what were the apparent contradictions in the attitude of the South toward blacks?

Having proved . . . our right to legislate in the manner proposed, I proceed to illustrate the propriety of exercising it. And here I might rest satisfied with reminding

¹*Annals of Congress*, 15th Congress, 2d Sess., 1174–1176.